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Abstract. Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest
with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (2 < R < 1) has
countably innitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated
on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accu-
mulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a
cost of being halfhearted,which is absent from both the lottery contest
and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively
skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-
post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.
Keywords. Tullock contest, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical
functions.
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1. Introduction
Even after several decades, the game-theoretic analysis of Tullocks (1980)
model of a political contest is still incomplete. Indeed, Nash equilibria in ei-
ther pure or mixed strategies have been described explicitly only for a range of
lower values of the decisiveness parameter (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992;
Nti, 1999), and for the limit case of the all-pay auction (Hillman and Samet,
1987; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996), but not so for intermedi-
ate values. As has been widely acknowledged, this lack of a game-theoretic
prediction is undesirable, in particular because the resulting constraints on
the decisiveness parameter do not have a proper economic motivation (Che
and Gale, 2000; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009; Schweinzer and Segev, 2012;
Szymanski and Valetti, 2003).
For the case of intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (2 <
R < 1), in which a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, Baye
et al. (1994) proved the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium with complete rent dissipation, and subsequently approximated the
limit distribution by calculating equilibria of rent-seeking games with nite
strategy spaces. Building on those results, Alcade and Dahm (2010) showed
that many contests of intermediate decisiveness allow a mixed-strategy equi-
librium that shares important statistics with the equilibrium of the corre-
sponding all-pay auction.1 However, a more structural understanding of the
limit distribution remained elusive. For example, it was not known if the limit
distribution is continuous like in the case of the all-pay auction, or a nite col-
1These statistics include the probability of becoming active, the average level of expen-
diture, the ex-ante probability to win, as well as expected payo¤s.
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lection of mass points as in Che and Gales (2000) analysis of di¤erence-form
contests, or something completely di¤erent. Moreover, numerical calcula-
tions based on contests with nite strategy spaces have tended to o¤er only
rather low-resolution images of the limit distribution.2
The present paper addresses these issues by deriving new structural prop-
erties of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in the rent-seeking game. Speci-
cally, it is shown that any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the Tul-
lock contest of intermediate decisiveness entails countably innitely many
mass points. Moreover, all probability weight is concentrated on these mass
points. Finally, the mass points form a discrete set in the strategy space,
and accumulate only at the zero bid, which itself is played with probability
zero.
These ndings are potentially important because they imply that the
equilibrium prediction for intermediate values of the decisiveness parame-
ter di¤ers structurally (even though not necessarily statistically) from the
tractable cases that have been studied more frequently in the literature.
Indeed, contrasting both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction, the
equilibrium bid distribution for intermediate values of the decisiveness pa-
rameter has a non-convex support, which is implied by a cost of bidding a
strict convex combination of any two distinct positive optimal bids.3
2To address the problem, one may choose to modify the game (Dari-Mattiacci and
Parisi, 2005; Amegashie, 2012). While those alternative approaches might prove useful,
they do not necessarily solve the original problem (cf. Münster, 2007).
3Also the equilibria studied by Che and Gale (2000) feature a non-convex best response
set. However, in their framework, any convex combination of two optimal positive bids is
again optimal.
3
Figure 1. Equilibrium payo¤ functions in the two-player Tullock contest
The main tools for proving the results of this paper are taken from the
realm of complex analysis. More specically, one considers a contestants
equilibrium payo¤ function, i.e., the expected payo¤ of a contestant as a
function of her own expenditure, assuming that the other contestants adhere
to the equilibrium strategy. See Figure 1 for illustration. It is then shown
that the equilibrium payo¤function allows a complex-analytic extension to an
open connected subset of C that encompasses the real interval (0;1).4 But
any non-constant function that is analytic over an open connected subset
of the complex numbers has a discrete set of zeros. Since all expenditure
levels in the support of a mixed equilibrium strategy necessarily yield the
same expected payo¤, this allows deducing that all positive bids used in an
equilibrium strategy must be isolated points of the support, which is the key
4Generally, a function is called analytic when it can be represented locally by a con-
verging power series. See Section 2 for a formal denition.
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ingredient of the equilibrium analysis.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The necessary ma-
terial from complex analysis is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 states and
proves the discreteness result. The equilibrium characterization can be found
in Section 4. Section 5 o¤ers numerical illustrations. Concluding remarks are
collected in Section 6. Appendix A describes the numerical approach that
has been used to calculate examples of bid distributions.
2. Background on analytic functions
This section recalls some concepts and results from complex analysis. For
further details and proofs, the reader is referred to any textbook on the topic,
such as Conway (1978).
Here is the denition of a complex-analytic function.
Denition 2.1. A complex-valued function f is complex-analytic in an open
set U  C if, at any point z0 2 U , there is a power series
P1
m=0 m(z  z0)m
in z around z0, with coe¢ cients m 2 C for m = 0; 1; 2; :::, that converges to
f(z) for all z in a neighborhood V  U of z0.
A zero of a complex-valued function f is a point z in the domain of f such
that f(z) = 0. The following result says that the zeros of a non-constant
complex-analytic function on a connected open set necessarily form a discrete
set.
5To obtain the discreteness result, it would in principle su¢ ce to show that the equi-
librium payo¤ function is real-analytic on (0;1). However, I have not been able to prove
this result without resorting to methods from complex analysis.
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Lemma 2.2. If f is a complex-analytic function on an open connected
set U  C and if there is a sequence of distinct points z1; z2; ::: in U with
z0 = limn!1 zn 2 U and such that f(zn) = 0 for n = 1; 2; :::, then f(z) = 0
for all z 2 U .
The following two standard results in complex analysis serve as the main tech-
nical tools to show that the equilibrium payo¤ function in the rent-seeking
game allows an analytic extension to some complex domain that contains the
interval (0;1).
Lemma 2.3 (Cauchys Theorem) Let f be a complex-analytic function
on the open set U  C. Then
H

f(z)dz = 0 (1)
for every closed rectiable curve  that is homotopic to zero in U .
Lemma 2.4 (Moreras Theorem) Let f be a continuous complex-valued
function on the open set U  C. Suppose that equation (1) holds for every
triangular path  in U . Then f is complex-analytic in U .
3. The support of mixed equilibria in the Tullock contest
In the sequel, I will discuss only the simple example of a two-player rent-
seeking game.6 Each player i = 1; 2 chooses a level of expenditure xi  0.
For a xed value of the parameter R  0, player is payo¤ in the rent-seeking
game is given by
i(xi; xj) =
xRi
xRi + x
R
j
  xi, (2)
6See Section 6 for a discussion of the scope of the results of this paper.
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where j 6= i, and the ratio is interpreted as 1
2
if the denominator vanishes.
Recall the following facts about the equilibrium set of this game. For
0  R  2, there exists a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
which each agent invests R
4
. For 2 < R <1, however, there does not exist a
pure-strategy equilibrium. Instead, there exists a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium with complete rent dissipation.7
The following lemma collects those properties of Tullocks impact func-
tionthat are relevant for the discreteness result stated further below.
Lemma 3.1. For any nite R  0, the function h(xi) = xRi allows a
complex-analytic extension bh to an open neighborhood H of (0;1) in C.
Moreover, h(xi) > 0 for any xi > 0.
Proof. Denoting by ln zi the principal value of the complex logarithm, the
mapping bh(zi) = exp(R  ln zi) is complex-analytic on the halfplane H =
fzi 2 C : Re(zi) > 0g. Clearly, bh(xi) = h(xi) for any xi > 0. This proves the
rst claim. The second claim is obvious. 
Fix now some parameter value R, and take some symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium  of the rent-seeking game with decisiveness R. The
following result provides some information about the support S of .
Theorem 3.2. S \ (0;1) is discrete, and allows only the zero bid as a
potential accumulation point.
7To dene mixed-strategy equilibria, I follow the usual approach according to which
mixed strategies correspond to probability distributions on the respective players space
of pure strategies (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Baye et al., 1994; Yang, 1994).
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Proof. For " 2 (0; 1) and  > 0 small, consider the rectangular domain
U("; ) = fzi 2 C : " < Re zi < 1
"
, jIm zij < g, (3)
that is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Construction of the domain U("; )
It is claimed rst that, for any " 2 (0; 1), there is some  = (") > 0 such
that the complex-valued function
ei(zi; xj) = bh(zi)bh(zi) + xRj   zi (4)
is well-dened and bounded on U("; )R+. To prove this claim, take some
" 2 (0; 1). On the non-empty compact interval I" = ["; 1" ], the continuous
function h assumes a minimum value M > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 3.1, h
allows a complex-analytic extension bh to an open neighborhood H of (0;1)
in C. Since bh is continuous, there exists, for any xi 2 I", some 1(xi) > 0 such
that Re(bh(zi)) > M2 for any zi 2 H with jzi   xij < 1(xi). Exploiting the
compactness of I" another time, there are nitely many x1i ; :::; x

i 2 I" such
that for any xi 2 I", there is some 0 2 f1; :::; g with jxi   x0i j < 1(x0i ).
Hence (see again Figure 2), there exists a  > 0 such that Re(bh(zi)) > M2
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for any zi 2 U("; ). For this value of , the function ei is indeed well-
dened and bounded on U("; )  R+. To prove the theorem, consider now
the complex-valued equilibrium payo¤ function
i(zi) =
Z ei(zi; xj)d(xj). (5)
Because the integrand is bounded on U("; )  R+ as well as continuous
in zi over U("; ) for any xj  0, and because  has a compact support,
Lebesgues Dominated Convergence Theorem implies that i is continuous
on U("; ). To show that i is even complex-analytic in U("; ), consider an
arbitrary triangular path  in U("; ). Then, for any xj  0, since U("; ) is
contractible and ei(; xj) is complex analytic in U("; ), Cauchys Theorem
implies that I

ei(zi; xj)dzi = 0. (6)
Integrating over  yieldsZ I

ei(zi; xj)dzi d(xj) = 0. (7)
Since  has a compact support, and ei is bounded on U("; )R+, one may
exchange the order of integration in equation (7), so thatI

Z ei(zi; xj)d(xj) dzi = 0. (8)
But  was arbitrary, so that Moreras Theorem implies that i is indeed
analytic in the complex domain U("; ). On the other hand, i is non-
constant in U("; ) for " su¢ ciently small because i(xi)  1   xi for any
xi  0. Fix now any xi 2 S such that xi > 0. For " su¢ ciently small, xi is an
interior point of I". Since xi is a best response to 
, one has i(xi )  = 0,
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where  denotes the expected equilibrium payo¤. By Lemma 2.2, there is
an open neighborhood bV of xi in U("; ) such that xi is the only zero of
i   in bV . But then, eV = bV \R++ is an open neighborhood of xi in the
strategy set R+ such that xi is the only best response to  in eV . 
4. Equilibrium characterization
By Theorem 3.2, any symmetric Nash equilibrium  of the rent-seeking
game has the property that the intersection of its support S with (0;1)
is discrete and allows only the zero bid as a potential accumulation point.
Thus, either S is nite, or the zero bid is an accumulation point of S.
For R > 2, however, it will be shown below that the origin necessarily is
an accumulation point of S.8 It is also shown that for R  2, there are
no symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in addition to the well-known pure-
strategy equilibrium.
As before, I will restrict attention to the simplest of all cases, and leave
any discussion to Section 6.
Theorem 4.1. In any symmetric equilibrium of the two-player rent-seeking
game with 2 < R < 1, the support of the distribution of expenditure levels
has the zero bid as an accumulation point. Thus, the equilibrium is charac-
terized by a sequence of mass points
y1 > y2 > ::: > 0, (9)
chosen with respective positive probabilities q1; q2; :::, so that limk!1 yk = 0
8This specic argument is applied more generally in a companion paper (2012).
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and
P1
k=1 qk = 1. Moreover,
1X
k=1
qky
R
K
yRK + y
R
k
  yK = 0, (10)
1X
k=1
qkRy
R 1
K y
R
k
(yRK + y
R
k )
2
  1 = 0, (11)
for any integer K  1. Finally, there are no non-degenerate mixed-strategy
equilibria for R  2.
Proof. Suppose that the zero bid is not an accumulation point of S. Then,
using Theorem 3.2, S is discrete and compact, hence nite. Let y1 > y2 >
::: > yL be the mass points of the equilibrium bid distribution, used with
respective probabilities q1; :::; qL, where
PL
k=1qk = 1. From the rst-order
condition at yL,
LX
k=1
qkRy
R 1
L y
R
k
(yRL + y
R
k )
2
= 1, (12)
one obtains
LX
k=1
2yRk
yRL + y
R
k
qky
R
L
yRL + y
R
k
  yL = 2 R
R
yL: (13)
But since yk  yL for k = 1; :::; L, it follows that
LX
k=1
qky
R
L
yRL + y
R
k
  yL  2 R
R
yL: (14)
Thus, for R > 2, bidding yL yields a negative expected payo¤ in equilibrium,
which is impossible. The contradiction shows that the origin is necessarily
an accumulation point of S. To prove equation (10), one notes that
 =
1X
k=1
qky
R
K
yRK + y
R
k
  yK , (15)
for any index K  1, where  is the expected equilibrium payo¤, as be-
fore. Taking the limit K ! 1, and subsequently exchanging the sum and
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the limit via Lebesgues Dominated Convergence Theorem implies then that
 = 0. Finally, it is shown that there are no non-degenerate mixed-strategy
equilibria for R < 2. Indeed, by Theorem 3.2, any symmetric equilibrium bid
distribution consists of discretely located mass points fykgLk=1 that are cho-
sen with probabilities fqkgLk=1, where L  1. Consider now the rst-order
condition at y1, i.e.,
LX
k=1
qkRy
R 1
1 y
R
k
(yR1 + y
R
k )
2
  1 = 0. (16)
Arguing as above, this implies
LX
k=1
qky
R
1
yR1 + y
R
k
  y1  2 R
R
y1, (17)
where the inequality is strict if L > 1. Hence, for R  2, rent dissipation
would be imperfect in any non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium. As
pointed out above, however,  > 0 is feasible only if the zero bid is not
an accumulation point of S. Thus, L is nite. Comparing now (17) with
(14) shows that, indeed, L = 1. Thus, any symmetric equilibrium in the
two-player Tullock contest with R  2 is necessarily in pure strategies. 
The equilibrium description provided by Theorem 4.1 contrasts with both
the unique (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in the lottery contest and the
unique (mixed-strategy) equilibrium in the all-pay auction. As already ex-
plained in the Introduction, the peculiar nature of the mixed-strategy equi-
libria in the Tullock contest is caused by the nonconvexity of the relevant
best-response set, which is illustrated by Figure 1. Intuitively, the subopti-
mality of bids placed, e.g., strictly between bids y1 and y2, captures a cost
of being halfheartedin the sense that such positive bids are too low to be
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e¤ective against a decisive action by the opponent, but at the same time too
high as a measured defense against speculative underbidding.
5. Numerical illustrations
5.1 Solving the innite system
While Theorem 4.1 claries the structure of the mixed-strategy equilibrium
in the Tullock contest, it is also desirable to learn more about the specic
values of the parameters yk and qk. Since an explicit solution of equations
(10-11) is not readily available, I truncated the innite system and solved the
resulting nite system numerically.9 Parameter values obtained along these
lines, rounded to the fourth digit, are shown in Table I. As can be seen, for
R kept xed, the probability weight qk is generally declining in k. Moreover,
an increase in R pushes the mass points more tightly together and to higher
levels, at the same time lowering q1. In sum, this may be seen as rening
somewhat an earlier description given by Baye et al. (1994).10
9The numerical procedure is described in more detail in Appendix A.
10Baye et al. (1994, p. 372) write: For R = 3 and Q > 4, one generally nds that all
probability mass is loaded on the rst few probabilities py, with most mass loaded on the
higher pysIn this statement, the parameter Q denotes the value of the prize, which is in
their setting also the number of grid points.
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Table I. Numerical bid distributions
5.2 Higher moments of the bid distributions
Figure 3 exhibits the rst four moments of the numerical bid distribution.
As the right-upper panel illustrates, the skewness of the bid distribution is
generally negative for R > 2, in contrast to the corresponding case of the
all-pay auction. Moreover, with variance increasing and skewness vanish-
ing for higher R, a higher degree of decisiveness seems to foster speculative
underbidding.
Figure 3: Moments of the numerical bid distributions
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5.3 Overdissipation
Figure 4 shows the probability of ex-post overdissipation, (R), as a function
of R. Somewhat unexpectedly, (R) exceeds, for some values of R, the prob-
ability of ex-post overdissipation in the all-pay auction, which is 0.5 (Baye et
al., 1999). In fact, (R) approaches unity for R close to 2. These possibilities
are obviously related to the discreteness of the equilibrium bid distribution.
Figure 4. The probability of ex-post overdissipation
6. Concluding remarks
While Theorem 3.2 has been stated and proved only for symmetric equilibria
in the two-player Tullock contest, it reects a more general fact. Indeed, it
is not hard to see that the proof extends to settings with more than two
players, heterogeneous valuations, and alternative impact functions.11
Similarly, variants of Theorem 4.1 can be derived for other classes of
contests. In particular, the arguments made above extend to the case of
11For example, it su¢ ces to assume that the impact function h(xi) is real-analytic on the
interval (0;1), which is the case for many functional forms considered in the literature.
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symmetric equilibria in Tullock contests with N  2 players, where then
non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibria exist if and only if R > N=(N  1).
Starting from Theorem 4.1, one may also obtain an explicit characteriza-
tion of all-pay auction equilibria constructed by Alcade and Dahm (2010) in
contests with heterogeneous valuations. For example, if N  2 contestants
possess respective valuations v1; :::; vN , where v1  v2  :::  vN > 0, then
player 1 randomizes over innitely many positive mass points fykv2g1k=1 with
probabilities fqkg1k=1, player 2 randomizes over f0g [ fykv2g1k=1 with prob-
abilities 1   v2=v1 and fqkv2=v1g1k=1, while players 3; :::; N remain inactive.
The characterization of the symmetric two-player equilibrium thereby sheds
light also on the structure of equilibria in more general contests.
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Appendix A. Numerical approach
Numerical bid distributions in the symmetric two-player Tullock contest have
been calculated by focusing on conditions (10-11) for indices K  Kmax,
where Kmax = 14, and by stipulating that yk = 0 for k > Kmax. This
approach led to a system of equations
qK = 2(1 
K 1X
k=1
qk   yK + K(yK)  K(yK)) (18)
=
4yK
R
(1  0K(yK) + 0K(yK)), (19)
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for K = 1; :::; Kmax, with error terms
K(x) =
K 1X
k=1
qkx
R
xR + yRk
, (20)
K(x) =
KmaxX
k=K+1
qky
R
k
xR + yRk
. (21)
Ignoring all error terms generated useful initial values for approximate so-
lution vectors fykgKmaxk=1 and fqkgKmaxk=1 . In explicit terms, these initial values
were yK =
R(R 2)K 1
(R+2)K
and qK =
4(R 2)K 1
(R+2)K
, for K = 1; :::; Kmax. Approxi-
mate solutions could then be improved locally at the K-th mass point, for
any K = 1; :::; Kmax, by solving (18-19) numerically for updated values
eyK and eqK of yK and qK . To ensure a cumulative probability of one, any
updated probability vector (q1; :::qK 1; eqK ; qK+1; :::; qKmax ; 1 PKmaxk=1 qk) was
multiplied through with 1=(1   qK + eqK). A Visual Basic macro executed
about 40 round-robin iterations of such updating. For any considered value
of R > 2, the procedure always converged to the same distribution, regardless
of changes made to initial conditions.
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